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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates complementarities between components of the organizational design of franchising networks. 
We examine three components of governance, rarely distinguished as such in previous studies involving franchising: 
allocation of decision rights, performance measurement and incentives. We also analyze interdependencies between 
these variables. In particular, interdependencies seem more evident between the incentive system and the allocation 
of decision rights to franchisees, and between the incentive system and performance measurement. We also provide 
evidence of the role of three franchisee characteristics in franchising’s organizational design: multi-unit ownership, 
age of the relationship, and geographic distance. Implications for chain management are provided. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
everal researchers have discussed the role of complementarities in organizational design (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman, 2003). Following Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman (1997) suggest that the organizational architecture 
of the firm consists of three complementary components: performance measurement, incentive compensation or 
rewards, and allocation of decision rights. With the exception of O’Connor, Deng and Luo (2006) and Widener, 
Shackell and Demers (2008), little empirical research has explicitly considered all three components simultaneously 
and examined interdependences between them. Prior empirical research has largely examined each of these three 
decisions as separately determined aspects of organizational design. We extend the work of O’Connor et al. (2006) 
and Widener et al. (2008), which examines the joint determination of incentive compensation, performance 
measurement and delegation by investigating complementarities among the three elements of the firm’s organizational 
architecture in a franchising framework.  
 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find an overall interdependency among the three components of franchising’s 
organizational design. In particular, interdependencies seem more evident between the incentive system (punishment 
mechanism) and allocation of decision rights to franchisees (delegation of decision power), and between the incentive 
system and performance measurement (nonfinancial output measures). We also provide evidence of the role of three 
franchisee characteristics in franchising’s organizational design: multi-unit ownership, age of the relationship, and 
geographic distance. 
 
The implication of our findings for franchisors is that there are complements and substitutes available in the choice of 
organizational design components. Our results suggest that in franchising networks, franchisors use fewer punishment 
mechanisms to offset the loss of control that arises from the allocation of decision rights to franchisees. Further, there 
is evidence that the relation between monitoring franchisee performance and incentives is complementary in our 
setting, suggesting that franchisee behavior evaluation (nonfinancial measures) is viewed as a basis for sanctions.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews and substantiates the theoretical studies that 
underlie our research hypotheses and the choice of variables. Section 3 describes the sample and explains the research 
method, and defines our empirical proxies. Section 4 provides a descriptive analysis of the constructs. Section 5 
presents our model specification and discusses our empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
S 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2016 Volume 32, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1200 The Clute Institute 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
We begin this section by presenting a general hypothesis of interdependencies among the three traditional components 
of organizational design (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Brickley et al., 2003), and we 
define the specific predictions in a franchising framework. Next, we integrate franchisee characteristics to examine 
incentive effects of these characteristics on the scope of organizational design components. 
 
Allocation of Decisions Rights and Performance Measurement 
 
Organizational architecture theory states that decentralization and performance measurement systems are two 
complementary choices that managers make simultaneously (Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; 
Brickley et al., 1997). More recent studies have empirically investigated this link (Abernethy, Bouwens and Van Lent, 
2004; Moers, 2006; Widener et al., 2008). Most of these studies are based on economic theories showing that the 
choice of performance measures in incentive contracts should be based on the informativeness (or incremental 
information content) principle.1 
 
Several studies dealing with performance evaluation systems distinguish financial and nonfinancial criteria (Ittner and 
Larker, 2002). Financial indicators such as costs, profits, and accounting returns have long dominated performance 
evaluation systems. Johnson and Kaplan (1987) highlight the need to integrate nonfinancial indicators in the 
performance measurement system. Accordingly, literature suggests that financial performance measures alone are less 
effective in a long-term business strategy geared towards customer satisfaction (Perera, Harrison and Poole, 1997), 
quality (Ittner and Larcker, 1998 and 2002), differentiation (Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985) or just-in-time 
deployment (Fullerton and McWatters, 2002), and monitoring environment uncertainty (Hoque, 2005). In this context, 
organizations need a multidimensional control system allowing managers to assess changes in their environment and 
track their progress in achieving corporate goals (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Thus, a strategy and performance 
evaluation system should operate in a consistent manner, broadly based on nonfinancial measures. 
 
The franchisee sales effort affects its own financial performance widely and directly. It is primarily controlled by the 
residual claimant status implying, according to Jensen and Meckling (1992), implicit control (Brickley and Dark, 
1987). However, the marketing effort does not exclude problems of moral hazard and information asymmetry 
regarding the results produced by the franchisee.2 The opportunistic behavior becomes more common as autonomy 
granted to franchisee increases leading franchisors to favor explicit forms of control rather than implicit control based 
on residual claimant status.3 
 
Notwithstanding, monitoring franchisees’ financial performance is quite tricky and insufficient for many reasons. 
First, the legal and financial independence of franchisees largely limits the franchisor’s ability to set objectives for 
units, especially financial ones. A franchisor may not require a franchisee to achieve a certain sales volume or a certain 
level of profitability or to limit the costs of its unit to a certain level. Franchisors that did so might be accused of 
interference. Second, even if the franchise agreement requires the franchisee to communicate certain accounting and 
financial information to the company, implementing a reporting procedure is fairly delicate and is not well accepted 
and implemented by franchisees (Lafontaine and Slade, 1998; Quinn, 1999). Third, franchisees were expected to 
develop the brand reputation, to maintain the high standard of shop fitting, to sell only approved products and to 
comply with the franchisor's advice. This objective may not be shared by all members because the benefits of this 
effort are not fully capitalized by franchisees. Therefore, franchisees will essentially allocate their effort to develop 
their local market at the expense of maintaining the brand reputation, which is, by nature, a public good. Thus, the 
franchisee may under-invest in brand maintenance, for example, by offering a discount price at the expense of product, 
service or brand image quality, lowering their investments in new products, local advertising, hiring and training sales 
																																																						
1 Agency models demonstrate that performance measurement systems should include any (costless) performance measure that provides increment
al information to promote congruence between their different objectives (Banker and Datar, 1989; Feltham and Xie, 1994). 
2 Moral hazard can result either from under declaration (or underscoring) of franchise sales to reduce the amount of royalties, lowering service or 
product quality, or reducing investments in advertising and promotion. 
3 Franchisors can closely monitor the financial condition of franchisees through the franchisees’ obligation to periodically present their financial st
atements by providing the company with financial reports and “sales data” (Lafontaine and Slade, 1998; Quinn, 1999). 
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personnel, and under-providing informational and promotional services (Arruñada, Garicano and Vázquez, 2001). 
This opportunism directly affects the brand image, even if the unit sales may not be affected, at least in the short term. 
For this reason, the franchisor is supposed to monitor nonfinancial performance, focusing on key success factors 
(product quality and customer satisfaction).  
 
Delegation of decision rights to franchisees allows them to perform multiple tasks. To ensure that franchisees act in 
the best interests of the network, the franchisor must use specific task-related measures instead of one broad aggregated 
measure when franchisees face multiple tasks. Banker, Potter and Srinivasan (1995) argue that detailed performance 
evaluations should include quality, material use, labor use, and service measures. Similarly, Baiman and Baldenius 
(2009) show that nonfinancial measures can signal whether agents (franchisees) act in a cooperative fashion or can 
put bounds on non-cooperative behavior. This analysis fits perfectly with the organizational architecture theory, which 
assumes that decentralization can be explained by strategies focused on environment uncertainty, pricing, quality 
improvement, and customer satisfaction. Nonfinancial criteria are integrated in this decentralization by ensuring 
consistency between strategy and allocation of decision rights (Brickley et al., 1997). Thus, nonfinancial criteria 
ultimately dominate when the decision-making function is decentralized. Based on the discussion above, we formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The evaluation of franchisees' nonfinancial performance depends on the level of the decision making power 
allocated to them. 
 
Allocation of Decisions Rights and Incentive System 
 
Delegation and incentive systems are a jointly determined organizational design problem (Baiman and Rajan, 1995). 
Jensen and Meckling (1992) argue that delegation of decisions to the best-informed party may reduce the costs of 
information gathering and transfer, but it will lead to agency problems, as agents' objectives are typically different 
from the principal’s. This will increase the need to use control to align agents' utility functions with the organization's 
overall objective. However, lodging decisional power with someone who has better incentives to make good decisions 
may mitigate the need for costly control. According to Brickley et al. (1997), an effective organizational architecture 
not only allocates decision-making authority to individuals who hold relevant information, but ensures that decision-
makers are subject to appropriate incentive systems to make decisions that create value. In sum, incentives and 
delegation are complementary (Roberts, 2004). 
 
In the presence of quasi-rents, the prospect of termination promotes compliance. Indeed, franchise contracts do not 
rely exclusively on monetary incentives to ensure that franchise contracts do not rely exclusively on monetary 
incentives to ensure that franchisees perform as required; they also rely on the possibility of contract termination. The 
ability to break the franchise relationship evidently underpins the “self-enforcement” mechanism (Klein, 1980; Klein 
and Leffler, 1981; Klein and Saft, 1985; Klein, 1995) that allows franchisors to play a quasi-judiciary role in ensuring 
that franchisees fulfill their obligations. According to Klein (1995), the self-enforcement mechanism of the franchise 
contract is derived from the combination of three elements: the existence of a flow of quasi-rents, the control exercised 
by the franchisor on the franchisee and the franchisor’s ability to terminate the contract.4 The self-enforcement 
mechanism operates by granting to store owners compensation that exceeds what they could earn outside of the 
relationship (i.e., economic rents). The threat of relationship termination should then ensure behavior in line with the 
principal’s economic interests because the premium stream would be lost by franchisees upon termination. Thus, in 
the presence of quasi-rents, the prospect of termination promotes compliance. Given this economic analysis, we would 
expect that the higher the franchisees’ discretion, the greater the incentive provided by the threat of contract 
termination. Based on the above discussion, we advance the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The threat of contract termination is related to the decision making power given to franchisees. 
  
																																																						
4 Klein (1995) defines quasi-rents as the additional earnings for a franchisee from its membership in the network; the control exercised by the fran
chisor on the franchisee; and the franchisor’s ability to terminate the contract. 
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Performance Measurement and Incentive System 
 
According to agency theory, the performance evaluation system and incentive system jointly constitute the control 
system, the second part of the organizational architecture (Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Brickley et al., 1997). The 
interaction between the two components is obvious. Indeed, evaluation and reward go hand in hand: each is 
meaningless without the other. Agency theory suggests that principals must design an incentive-compatible system, 
which ensures appropriate assessment of agents’ results and actions. In other words, the agents’ compensation must 
be based on criteria that truly reflect their efforts in performing the tasks assigned to them, or they would be inclined 
to behave in an opportunistic manner.  
 
Incentive systems can be more efficient if they include more accurate and precise performance measures (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992). In short, better performance measures should lead to stronger incentives, because relying on more 
precise measures reduces the costs of incentive risk (Roberts, 2004; Widener et al., 2008). The franchise formula has 
inherent strongly incentive elements in that a franchisee represents a residual claimant under agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1992; Brickley and Dark, 1987). The franchisee’s income ultimately depends on the success of its 
business and thus on its own effort.  
 
Nevertheless, basing the franchisee incentive system on purely financial criteria is irrelevant.5 Including qualitative 
and strategic criteria (sales team dynamism, product quality, and adequacy of matching customer needs) in a franchisee 
incentive system is essential to motivate franchisees to act in accordance with the wishes of the franchisor, even though 
this assessment is based mainly on a subjective assessment of the franchisor rather than on a formal measurement 
system. 
 
Arruñada et al. (2005) suggest that termination is used to deal with serious or repeated non-performance as observed 
through the outputs, inputs and financial statements of the dealer.6 Sales and service targets provide an important 
determinant of the termination process. Dealers’ inputs are directly monitored by manufacturer inspections. Inspectors 
visit dealerships randomly at their discretion to ensure compliance with input obligations related to the provision of 
an adequate service level. Accordingly, we expect to find complementarity between incentives based on the threat of 
contract termination and nonfinancial performance measures, and we expect the structural relation to be positive. 
 
H3: The threat of contract termination depends on the evaluation of franchisee's nonfinancial performance 
 
The Role of Franchisee Specific Incentive Characteristics  
 
Several studies have assumed that the organizational design of franchise networks depends on certain franchisee 
characteristics (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Dant and Nasr, 1998; Windsperger, 2003; Cochet, Dormann and Ehrmann, 
2008). In the present study, we focus on the effects of three franchisee characteristics that have previously been posited 
to affect agency issues in the dyad: (1) multi-unit ownership, (2) age of the franchisee-franchisor relationship, and (3) 
geographic distance between the outlet and the company’s head office. 
 
Multi-Unit Ownership or Multi-Franchise: 
 
A situation where one franchisee owns, operates and controls more than one outlet (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996). Dant 
and Nasr, (1998) distinguish between two types of multi-unit franchisees. While some multi-unit franchisees start with 
a single unit and acquire the rights to operate additional outlets over time, referred to as sequential expansion, others 
are entitled to run multiple units from the outset, referred to as master franchising. 
  
																																																						
5 As discussed previously, franchisee effort toward sales development affects its financial performance widely and directly. This effort is primarily 
controlled by the residual claimant status (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). In addition, the financial data of the franchised unit, for example sales vol
ume, could be subject to manipulation by the franchisee. 
6 According to Arruñada et al. (2005), dealership contracts can set out several nonperformance conditions that lead to termination. In particular, 
these contracts punish repeated non-fulfillment of sales and service targets with automatic termination. While most brands do not specify the 
thresholds they use to define these criteria, some brands have informed on the specific nonperformance criteria that lead to automatic termination. 
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Empirical evidence has shown that multi-unit franchisees are less likely to abuse their autonomy and to behave 
opportunistically (Dant and Nasr, 1998; Brickley, 1999; Dant and Gundlach, 1999). This is because the interests of 
multi-unit owners are closely aligned with those of the entire network. Most notably, incentives to free-ride on the 
common brand name are weakly expressed, even in non-repeat customer industries (Dant and Nasr, 1998). By cheating 
on quality, multiunit partners would jeopardize their own sales to a greater extent than would their single-unit 
counterparts. In other words, multi-unit franchisees support and approve the franchisor’s policies and strategic choices, 
replicate work methods and accept new ideas implemented by the franchisor more easily and quickly (Bradach, 1995, 
1998). Referring to Dant and Nasr (1998), Cochet et al. (2008) suggest that multi-unit ownership internalizes a large 
fraction of specific investments in the trade name. Further, due to higher stakes in question, head offices are less likely 
to terminate or non-renew contracts of multi-unit franchisees than those of single-unit ones. Therefore, multi-unit 
franchisees should project their channel membership farther into the future than their single-unit counterparts. 
Consequently, forgoing investments in quality would impair future sales of franchisees owning multiple units 
considerably (Dant and Nasr, 1998).  
 
Age of the Franchisee-Franchisor Relationship 
 
The time period since a franchisee started operating an outlet. It has been argued that relationship length influences 
governance practices inside networks (Dant and Nasr, 1998). Franchisees’ incentives to behave opportunistically 
decrease as the future time horizon over which investments in specific assets can be amortized lengthens. Further, 
potential gains from opportunistic deviations that would accrue in the short-run are more likely to be evened out by 
gains from cooperation as the discounting period increases (Cochet et al., 2008). 
 
Geographic Distance between the Outlet and the Company’s Head Office 
 
The franchisee’s (agent’s) behavior is imperfectly observable (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996), which makes controlling 
the franchisee difficult and costly for the franchisor (the principal). This control is much more difficult and expensive 
when the outlet is far from the franchisor. Paradoxically, units close to the franchisor’s headquarters and 
geographically concentrated units are easily controlled by the franchisor while taking advantage of economies of scale 
(Rubin, 1978; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Martin, 1988; Campbell, Datar and Sandino, 2009). Therefore, distance from 
the franchisor’s monitoring head office could hamper behavior control and encourage the franchisor to find less 
expensive alternatives. Agency theory assumes that centralization of decision making, as a form of direct control, can 
be a solution to the problem of imperfect supervision of agents’ behavior, particularly for agents far from the principal 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). In the same vein, result-based monitoring may be a relevant alternative to behavior-based 
monitoring, especially with continuing advances in information and communication technologies. However, electronic 
data transmission is often insufficient to convey information to the franchisor that accurately reflects the franchisee’s 
results (Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacques 1995), especially because the information systems of franchised units are 
rarely integrated with those of the head office (Bradach, 1997). 
 
METHODS 
 
Sample and Survey Methods 
 
The Likert-type questionnaire items have been formulated based on measurement scales validated by previous 
research and adapted to our context. We also confirmed the items in a qualitative-explorative pre-study involving 
franchisors, experts, and franchisees. These meetings were very helpful to develop and refine our questionnaire to a 
satisfactory ultimate version in both form and substance. The revised questionnaire was tested with seven franchisees, 
and then sent to 1,059 franchisees operating in France in 2011. The data were gathered through mail surveys conducted 
from mid-February 2012 through the end of April of that same year. Forty-two franchisors agreed to participate. Each 
mailing included the questionnaire, a cover letter describing the purposes of the study and guaranteeing anonymity to 
participants. We collaborated with the chains’ head offices in conducting the survey, yet participation in the study was 
voluntary. After reminder notices, the survey yielded a participation rate of 9.5% (97/1059). However, seven responses 
could not be exploited because of incomplete data, which implies a usable response rate of 8.5%. Our final sample 
consisted of 90 observations (Table 1).  
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Table 1. Distribution of franchisees in sample by chains and industries 
Industry Number of chains 
Weight of 
industry 
Number of 
franchisees reached 
Number of franchisees 
respondents 
Response 
rate 
Individual and Business Services 16 38% 322 43 13% 
Restaurant 7 17% 238 10 4% 
Housing, furniture-kitchen 6 14% 123 12 10% 
Real estate 5 12% 135 8 6% 
Specialized food retailing 3 7% 114 9 8% 
Specialized non-food retailing 5 12% 127 8 6% 
Total 42 100% 1059 90 9% 
 
Among the 42 brands that agreed to participate in our survey, 28 covered services (real estate, restaurants, and various 
services to individuals and businesses); they comprise more than 67% of the sample. Fewer than 35% of retailers 
conduct a specialized trade. This is consistent with the progression of the franchise in the service sector, particularly 
in local services to individuals and businesses. Indeed, France has seen an increasing expansion in the service sector 
in recent decades, and the franchise sector is following this trend. 
 
Construct Measurement 
 
In the following sections we provide descriptions of the empirical measures adopted as proxies for the constructs in 
our structural equations model. The three endogenous components of organizational architecture are measured using 
latent variables from several multi-item Likert scales (ADR, NFPM and TERM). Exogenous control variables are all 
measured using ordinal and nominal variables. The survey questions are shown in the Appendix A. 
 
We derive an empirical measure for ADR by using the latent construct extracted from four survey questions that are 
inspired by the questions underlying Nagar’s (2002) measure in retail banking and Windsperger’s (2004) delegation 
measure in Austrian franchising networks. Franchisees were asked to rate, on a five-point scale, their own influence 
relative to their franchisor’s influence on making decisions with respect to setting prices, and selecting suppliers and 
products. The higher the index, the greater the franchisee’s decision-making authority. Consequently, the allocation 
of decision rights varies positively with the degree of decentralization and negatively with the degree of centralization 
of decision making. 
 
To measure NFPM, respondents were asked to report on a 5-point scale the weight their franchisors assign to a range 
of possible nonfinancial measures in their performance assessment. This approach is consistent with that of earlier 
studies (Abernethy et al., 2004). Higher values for NFPM suggest that franchisors place more weight on nonfinancial 
output measures when evaluating franchisee behavior.  
 
Concerning the threat of contract termination, TERM, all contracts explicitly assign franchisors the right to terminate 
the contracts when the franchisee fails to perform certain duties. Meetings conducted with franchisors, franchisees 
and experts were very helpful to refine the measure of TERM while adapting it to the franchise context. Accordingly, 
franchisees were asked to rate, on a five-point scale, a range of causes that may result in contract termination.7  
 
To operationalize multi-unit ownership (MULTIFSE), a nominal no/yes question, coded as a dummy variable (no = 0; 
yes = 1), was used to classify franchisees interviewed in one of the following two categories: single-unit franchisees 
and multi-unit franchisees (Dant and Nasr, 1998; Dant and Gundlach, 1999; Cochet et al., 2008). This variable takes 
the value of 0 if the franchise belongs to the first category and 1 otherwise. 
 
Franchisees were asked to assess the age of the franchisee-franchisor relationship (AGE) by indicating the class to 
which they belong. For this, we have identified five classes “Between 2 and 5 years”, “More than 5 to 10 years”, 
																																																						
7 Arruñada et al. (2001) provide a list of potential causes that can motivate the termination of the dealer-manufacturer relationship in automobile d
istribution. In particular, repeated breach of sales and service targets, and changes in ownership or the bankruptcy of the dealership is always reaso
ns for automatic termination. Other circumstances such as management changes or disagreements among partners or managers also trigger termin
ation rights in some networks. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2016 Volume 32, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1205 The Clute Institute 
“More than 10 to 15 years”, “More than 15-20 years”, and “Over 20 years”. This measure is consistent with Dant and 
Nasr (1998) and Cochet et al. (2008). 
 
To operationalize Geographic distance (DISTANCE), Brickley and Dark (1987), Minkler (1992) and Cochet et al. 
(2008) calculated the number of kilometers or miles separating the franchisee from the franchisor headquarters. This 
approach was not feasible in our case. To do so, we followed the approach of Degryse and Ongena (2005) by using 
travel time between the franchisee and franchisor’s headquarters. We thus asked respondents to estimate the distance 
that separates them from the franchisor’s head office by choosing from among five classes: “Less than 10 min”, 
“Between 10 and 30 min”, “Between 30 and 60 min”, “Between 60 and 120 min”, and “More than 120 min”. 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Constructs 
 
The results of the descriptive analysis are derived initially from an exploratory factor analysis followed by a 
confirmatory one (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988). The descriptive statistics in the appendix A shows that all of the 
survey questions include a broad range of possible responses. Untabulated Pairwise correlations between items of 
each construct are positive and significant (largely in excess of 0.3 for all constructs). Moreover, the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) test of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity produce satisfactory results (Table 2), thus 
the information provided by the initial variables can be summarized in a few factors. The factor analyses using 
Varimax rotation for ADR, NFPM and TERM indicate one-dimensional constructs with acceptable explained variance 
(more than 50%) and eigenvalue (greater than 1). All items have a quality of representation (or communality) above 
0.4 and are well represented on their respective axes (Table 3). 
 
Table 2. KMO and Bartlett's test 
Construct ADR NFPM TERM 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.694 0.823 0.771 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 102.532 264.570 161.897 
df 10 6 6 
Sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Table 3. Exploratory factor analysis 
 Items Eigen-value Explained variance Loading Communality 
ADR 
ADRSUP 
2.519 62.978 
0.820 0.672 
ADRPRI 0.808 0.652 
ADRPDT 0.803 0.644 
ADRINV 0.742 0.550 
NFPM 
MONSAT 
2.796 80.592 
0.898 0.807 
MONHOL 0.882 0.779 
MONQAL 0.921 0.848 
MONCOM 0.889 0.790 
TERM 
TERM1 
2.277 69.910 
0.848 0.719 
TERM 2 0.816 0.666 
TERM 3 0.885 0.784 
TERM4 0.793 0.628 
 
 
The factor analysis, using a Varimax rotation, performed on all items (eleven items), produces a factor structure of 
three independent components (Table 4). Internal reliability or consistency of the summated scale was assessed by 
Cronbach’s alpha. The alpha scores, as shown in Table 5, were all well above the lower limit of acceptability, set at 
0.60 for newly developed scales (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998). 
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Table 4. Discriminant validity 
 NFPM TERM ADR 
MONSAT 0.875   
MONHOL 0.890   
MONQAL 0.887   
MONCOM 0.868   
TERM1  0.745  
TERM2  0.758  
TERM3  0.871  
TERM4  0.837  
ADRSUP   0.845 
ADRPRI   0.785 
ADRPDT   0.764 
ADRINV   0.723 
Eigen-value  3.329 2.801 2.622 
Explained variance 27.741 23.341 21.847 
Cumulative explained variance 27.741 51.082 72.928 
 
 
Table 5. Reliability Test 
Construct Cranach's alpha 
ADR 0.798 
NFPM 0.918 
TERM 0.855 
 
A second confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to verify that the multi-item measures used in this study 
exhibit acceptable measurement characteristics (Gerbing and Anderson, 1992). A global CFA measurement model 
was estimated. It consisted of three latent variables or constructs and eleven manifest or observed variables (see Figure 
1).  
 
Figure 1. Measurement model 
 
NFPM 
TERM ADR 
Chi-square = 72.178     p = 0.014     ddl = 48     GFI = 0.888      AGFI = 0.818      RMSEA = 0.075 
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In the original CFA model, the evaluation of the model and fit statistics are insufficient to move the analysis forward 
(Table 6). Although some adjustment indices are above the standards (GFI, AGFI, IFI, CF), others are not satisfactory, 
especially the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), which far exceeds the threshold of 0.8. This led 
us to re-specify the model by tolerating some correlations between the error terms of items measuring the same 
construct (Figure 1). We accepted these correlations because the modification indices suggest that they have the 
highest significant changes and could be justified by theoretical foundations. Thus, the link between MONHOL 
“Monitoring the holding of the point of sale” and MONCOM “Monitoring compliance with instructions” could be 
justified by the affinity of their titles. In fact, the monitoring of compliance with instructions could include monitoring 
the holding of an outlet. It is then expected that a mistake made for the answer to MONCOM logically affects the 
response to MONHOL. Also, the correlation between ADRPDT and ADRPRI can be explained by the fact that deciding 
which products or services to market is inextricably linked to setting prices, so that an incorrect answer for one variable 
may cause an error in the other. Similarly, TERM3 “False information” and TERM4 “Non-payment to the franchisor” 
are plausibly linked because false information provided by the franchisee to the franchisor mainly concerns sales data. 
Therefore, such franchisee behavior may occur in conjunction with evasion of royalty payment to the franchisor. 
 
Table 6. Adjustment indices of the measurement model 
Indices Initial model Respecified model Highest standards Lowest standards 
Absolute indices     
Chi-square (c2 ) 101.406 72.178  - - 
GFI 0.844 0.888 > 0.9 > 0,8 
AGFI 0.762 0.818 > 0.9 > 0,7 
RMSEA 0.105 0.075 < 0.05 < 0,08 
Incremental indices     
IFI 0.916 0.960 > 0.9 > 0,9 
CFI 0.914 0.959 > 0.95 > 0,9 
Parsimonious indices      
Normed Chi-square (c2 /df) 1.988 1.504 < 2 < 5 
CAIC 
(CAIC of saturated model)  
249.901 
(428.985) 
237.172 
(428.985) 
As low as possible (< CAIC of the saturated 
model) 
 
It is clear from Table 6 that the re-specified model fits the data better than the original model, regardless of the index. 
There are three adjustment indices that satisfy the most stringent standards (IFI, CFI and c2/df), and three indices 
(GFI, AGFI, RMSEA) far exceed the least stringent standards. The normed Chi-square (c2/df) and the CAIC measure 
are acceptable for both models while indicating that the re-specified model is the superior one. We decided to retain 
the measurement model after re-specification, represented as in Figure 1. 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Empirical Specification - Structural Equation Model 
 
We use AMOS software to estimate the causal relationships in our structural equation model. SEM provides an 
efficient technique for examining interdependent relationships such as those that we hypothesize to exist (Hair et al., 
1998). SEM is used both to address the question of whether the present data fit the relationships proposed by our 
theory and to examine the signs and significance of particular coefficient estimates of interest.  
 
With our sample of 90 franchisees, we acknowledge that we have a relatively small sample. We therefore take two 
critical steps to ensure that our sample size is adequate.8 First, we have reduced observable variables of each construct 
to a single indicator. We have thus followed the approach of Low, Cravens, Grant and Moncrief (2001), which 
involves replacing the items of each construct by their sum after checking its unidimensionality and reliability.9 
																																																						
8 However, small samples are not uncommon. Breckler (1990) reviewed 72 SEM studies in psychology, of which 16 (22%) were considered to 
consist of small samples. In the accounting literature, Nagar (2002) and Abernethy et al. (2004) examined only 100 and 78 firms respectively, while 
Widener et al. (2008) used a sample of 53 firms. 
9 This aggregation procedure changes our model to a simple one that includes only six observable variables (Marsh, Balla and McDonald, 1988). 
Thus, with a sample size of 90, we have a ratio of 15 observations to one observable variable, which exceeds the guideline of 10:1 (Jöreskog and S
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Second, to remedy the identification problem for structural models,10 we have fixed the variance terms of latent 
variables to be equal to the variance of the single measure multiplied by the difference between one and the value of 
Cronbach's Alpha (variance of the single indicator * (1-α)) (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1989; Hair et al., 1998) (Table 7).  
 
Table 7. Error variances of the indicators 
Indicator Variance s2 α 
Error variance 
q = s2 * (1- α) 
S_ADR 10.783 0.798 2.178 
S_NFPM 20.382 0.918 1.671 
S_TERM 12.859 0.855 1.864 
 
Further, we have modeled only the significant effects of control variables on the latent variables11 to estimate a 
parsimonious model. Thus, we reduce the number of parameters that we estimate to 19. With a sample size of 90, we 
have a ratio of 4.77 observations to one estimated parameter, which is very close to the guideline of 5:1 (Hair et al. 
1998). In fact, Tanaka (1987, p. 141) notes, “better than 4:1 subject to parameters ratio is not a particularly small 
ratio.”  
 
In conclusion, although our absolute sample size is relatively small, we have an acceptable sample size with which to 
estimate the relatively simple model described, with a ratio of better than ten observations to one observable variable 
and with a ratio of better than four observations to one estimated parameter (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Structural equation model 
 
 
 
Our data exhibit univariate normality (Table 8), yet new indicators, obtained after the substitution of items of each 
construct by their sum, represent a better approximation of the normal distribution. Indeed, the coefficients of 
symmetry (skewness) and kurtosis of each indicator do not exceed three and eight in absolute value respectively. The 
Mardia multivariate kurtosis coefficient is more than three but not significant, which is sufficient to meet the 
assumption of multivariate normality. 
																																																						
örbom, 1982). 
10 This problem is generated by the existence of latent variables with a single indicator. 
11 Normally, we have to estimate the effects of each control variable on the three organizational components of franchising design, but for reasons 
of identification and data fitting we removed the non-significant effects to simplify the model and reduce the number of parameters to be estimate
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Table 8. Assessment of univariate and multivariate normality of observable variables 
Variable skew c.r. kurtosis c.r. 
DISTANCE –1.682 –6.514 1.534 2.971 
AGE 0.339 1.312 –0.282 –0.546 
MULTIFSE 1.978 7.661 3.109 6.021 
S_ADR –0.150 –0.580 –1.036 –2.006 
S_TERM –0.833 –3.228 –0.301 –0.584 
S_NFPM –0.783 –3.031 –0.314 –0.608 
Multivariate   3.959 1.917 
 
The goodness-of-fit indices presented in Table 9 provide evidence of good model fit. All the indices are above the 
most stringent standards. We note a quite low Chi-square, and the GFI and AGFI meet the highest standards. Similarly, 
the IFI and CFI are sufficiently high, at one. RMSEA complies with the most stringent threshold (0.05). Regarding the 
parsimony of the model, the normed chi-square, being less than two, is consistent with the highest standard. Similarly, 
the model represents a CAIC index lower than that of the saturated model. In addition, the analysis of the standardized 
residual covariance matrix shows no residual term that exceeds the threshold of 2.58, which further affirms the good 
fit of the model. 
 
Table 9. Adjustment indices of the structural model 
Indices Structural model 
Absolute indices  
Chi-square (c2) 1.158 
GFI 0.996 
AGFI 0.955 
RMSEA 0.000 
Incremental indices   
IFI 1 
CFI 1 
Parsimonious indices   
Normed Chi-square (c2 /df) 0.579 
CAIC 105.655 
(CAIC of saturated model)  (302.490) 
 
 
Empirical Results and Implications 
 
In Table 10, we summarize the regression coefficients relating to causality between variables in the empirical model 
while distinguishing those that were the subject of hypotheses and those inherent to the effects of the control variables. 
 
 
Table 10. Structural equation results 
Dependent variable Independent variable Standard path coefficient CR p-value12 
Hypotheses 
NFPM ADR –0.137 –1.111 0.266 
TERM ADR –0.342 –3.030 0.002 
TERM NFPM 0.503 4.869 0.000 
Effects of control variables 
ADR DISTANCE 0.251 2.095 0.036 
ADR MULTIFSE 0.180 1.505 0.132 
NFPM AGE 0.049 0.449 0.653 
NFPM DISTANCE –0.192 –1.701 0.089 
TERM AGE –0.174 –1.739 0.082 
TERM DISTANCE 0.280 2.670 0.008 
TERM MULTIFSE 0.130 1.256 0.209 
																																																						
12 Reported p-values are based on two tailed calculations for all directional hypotheses. 
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From our empirical results, we derive that overall, the three components of firms’ organizational architecture are 
interdependent (Figure 2). Thus, we find no significant relation between the delegation of decision rights and 
nonfinancial performance measurement, but our SEM results provide evidence that these two variables are 
determinants of contract termination. However, we found only mixed evidence of the effect of franchisee incentive 
characteristics on the three organizational components. 
 
In our hypothesis H1, we argue that allocation of decision rights is positively associated with the use of nonfinancial 
performance measurement, but the coefficient of the interaction term was negative (β = –0.137) and not statistically 
significant (see Table 10). The data therefore did not support H1. The lack of a direct link between the allocation of 
decision rights and performance measurement has also marked previous studies such as Widener et al. (2008) and 
O'Connor et al. (2006).13 This result does not match the findings of theories of organizational architecture (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1992; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Brickley et al., 1997), underlying an interdependent relationship 
between decentralization and the control system. However, it should be noted that this relationship has been 
empirically validated in the context of intra-organizational relationships (Nagar, 2002; Moers, 2006). As an inter-
organizational relationship, the franchisor-franchisee relationship cannot be identical to the employer-employee 
relationship, usually based on the principle of the hierarchical submission of the employee. This control can thus be 
experienced by the franchisee as unwanted interference by the franchisor. Similarly, setting specific goals for 
franchisees can be difficult in the context of a legally and financially autonomous organization. Similarly, evaluating 
the results achieved may be difficult for the franchisor. Nevertheless, although the franchisor cannot easily set goals 
for its franchisees, it reserves the right to compare units based on their characteristics and those of their environments. 
This performance comparison can serve to detect operational anomalies in the franchised units. 
 
However, there is a negative (β = –0.342) and significant (p < 0.01) relationship between decentralization of decision 
rights and the threat of contract termination. Hence, H2 was well supported by the data. Although this result does not 
validate complementarity between the allocation of decision rights and the incentive system, as suggested by previous 
empirical work (Nagar, 2002; O'Connor et al., 2006; Moers 2006; Widener et al., 2008), it nonetheless confirms the 
interdependent relationship between the two components, according to the postulates of organizational architecture 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). This result also corroborates the findings of Arruñada et al. (2001) in automobile 
distribution networks. They showed a complementary relationship (positive) between the centralization of decision 
rights and the rights granted to the manufacturer to terminate the contractual relationship. Arruñada et al. (2001) justify 
their findings by the fact that centralization of decision rights is meaningless in the absence of incentive and dissuasive 
mechanisms that allow the manufacturer to insist that its dealers comply with its directives. These arguments imply 
that decentralization does not require substantial use of incentive mechanisms. 
 
It is important to note that in the French context, unilateral termination of the franchise agreement is prohibited in 
principle. Nevertheless, early termination (before the expiry of the contractual period) may exceptionally result from 
the option given to the parties to request the legal termination of the agreement.14 In fact, the franchisor can request 
early termination of the contract or refuse to renew it in case of non-performance or improper performance of 
franchisee obligations. However, any failure by the franchisee is insufficient to allow the franchisor to break the 
agreement. The decision must be motivated by seriousness, as if maintaining the contractual relationship would 
necessarily entail irreparable harm. This measure seeks to protect the franchisee from the franchisor’s arbitrariness. 
Termination is also authorized by provisions included in franchise agreements. Indeed, this provision specifies causes 
involving contract termination. It is constraining for the franchisee and reinforces the threat of contract termination. 
 
Our hypothesis H3 stated that contract termination becomes more threatening as the use of nonfinancial performance 
measures increases. The model displays a positive (β = 0.503) and significant (p < 0.001) coefficient of the interaction 
term between nonfinancial performance monitoring and contract termination. Hypothesis H3 is therefore strongly 
supported, in line with previous studies suggesting a complementary relationship between nonfinancial performance 
evaluation and incentive systems (Ittner, Larcker and Rajan, 1997; Ittner and Larcker, 2002). Indeed, monitoring the 
compliance of franchisees’ performance with the brand concept and guidelines is more feasible for the franchisor than 
																																																						
13 Widener et al. (2008) and O'Connor et al. (2006) explain this insight by the fact that there may be other organizational architecture approaches t
hat do not necessarily consider a direct relationship between these two components. 
14 Article 1184 of the French Civil Code. 
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monitoring financial and accounting performance (Dant and Nasr, 1998). We find evidence that the franchisor is more 
likely to exercise its termination right under nonfinancial performance assessment. 
 
Results on the effects of control variables show that geographical distance between the franchisee and the franchisor's 
headquarters positively affects the decentralization of decision rights (β = 0.251, p < 0.05) and the threat of contract 
termination (β = 0.280, p < 0.01), and negatively affects nonfinancial performance measurement (β = –0.192, p < 
0.10). 
 
Indeed, distance of franchisees from the franchisor’s head office, understood as an indicator of control costs, may 
present a real barrier to the franchisor’s monitoring of the franchisee’s nonfinancial performance. This monitoring 
requires direct supervision, which is more expensive when the franchisee is far from the franchisor (Brickley and 
Dark, 1987; Martin, 1988; Norton, 1988; Brickley et al., 1991; Agrawal and Lal, 1995). To reduce these control costs, 
the franchisor may limit the inspection frequency (Agrawal and Lal, 1995). It can consequently give its franchisees 
more responsibility by granting them more decision-making power (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Hence, the involvement 
of distant franchisees in the strategic and commercial choices of the network could be explained by their superiority 
in terms of local knowledge of demand, market conditions, competition and customer characteristics (Caves and 
Murphy, 1976; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988; Minkler, 1992). The transmission of this knowledge to a 
franchisor that is geographically distant from these markets is costly in terms of time and money (Windsperger, 2003 
and 2004).  
 
Moreover, the significance of the positive relationship between geographic distance and the threat of contract 
termination seems, at first glance, inconsistent with the previous result whereby distance is negatively related to the 
use of nonfinancial performance evaluation. Thus, there is no apparent logic in using contract termination for distant 
franchisees. However, this finding can be justified by considering that this threat, as perceived by the franchisees, can 
substitute for direct supervision. Given the difficulties related to implementation of very elaborate compliance control 
for distant franchisees, the franchisor can raise the threat of contract termination to deter deviant behavior in 
franchisees. 
 
Concerning the age of the franchise relationship, the results showed no significant effect of this variable on the 
franchisee’s performance evaluation, and a negative (β = –0.174) and statistically significant (p < 0.10) effect on 
contract termination. This result can be explained by the fact that the older the franchisee-franchisor relationship, the 
more expert and effective the franchisee is at operating its unit. Therefore, termination or non-renewal of its contract 
may pose a threat to the brand’s reputation, competition, growth and sustainability. Indeed, the eviction of an effective 
franchisee may act as a negative signal to current and potential partners (Gallini and Lutz, 1992). Furthermore, the 
evicted franchisee, with an accurate knowledge of the key success factors and weaknesses of its former network, 
becomes a potential competitor for this network.15 Lastly, breaking the contractual relationship with an old franchisee 
could lower the network’s revenues by wasting potential royalties, and ultimately impair its profitability. However, 
this threat should be put into perspective, in that the probability that the network is affected remains low because the 
number of franchisees concerned by this contract termination is much reduced. Finally, we did not note any significant 
coefficients of the effect of multi-unit ownership, on allocation of decisions rights or on contract termination. We find, 
however, that the coefficient of multi-unit ownership on ADR is positive (β = 0.180) and marginally significant (p < 
0.15).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the theoretical literature has recognized interdependencies, along with the structural nature of 
complementarities and substitutes between the various components of organizational design (Roberts, 2004), little 
empirical research has explicitly considered the interdependence of all three components, with the exception of 
O’Connor et al. (2006) and Widener et al. (2008). Our study is a pioneer in the application of organizational 
architecture theory on an inter-organizational form, namely the franchise. It allowed us to identify three components 
																																																						
15 The franchisee continues running its business in the same area as an independent trader either by developing its own concept, or by joining a co
mpetitor’s network. The franchisee can thus continue to benefit from the knowledge acquired from its former franchisor and divert some of its cus
tomers who are more attached to the franchisee than to the network’s brand name. 
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of governance, rarely distinguished as such in previous studies involving franchising, and to specify interdependencies 
between them. 
 
The results of this research are mixed and not fully consistent with the advances of the organizational theory of 
architecture. Nevertheless, we have demonstrated, at least generally, the existence of dependent relationships between 
different components of a franchising governance system. In particular, we found no direct causal link between the 
allocation of decision rights and performance evaluation systems. However, we observed that contract termination is 
negatively associated with the allocation of decisions rights and positively related to performance measurement. 
Overall, our research shows that the governance of franchise networks reposes on the juxtaposition of various control 
devices that should be considered as a part of a holistic system. We thus provide franchisees and franchisors with 
evidence of the ability of the franchise to balance control, autonomy and incentives. These three governance devices 
coexist and interact in franchisor-franchisee relationships. The allocation of decisions rights to franchisees may result 
in their greater involvement in the franchise relationship and consequently in increasing their weight in the network 
(by operating additional units, maintaining longer relationships with the franchisor, holding a strategic geographic 
location, etc.). Such a position may mitigate the threat of contract termination. However, the implementation of a non-
financial evaluation of franchisee performance is constraining for franchisees because contract termination depends 
largely on the implementation of the franchisor concept and compliance with the franchisor’s guidelines. 
 
Further, the data partly confirmed our thesis that franchisee incentive characteristics, such as geographic distance, 
multi-unit ownership and the age of the franchise relationship, reduce or intensify the need for decentralization and 
control mechanisms. Thus, in the design and implementation of a network governance system, the franchisor must 
take into account the characteristics of its partners: a nearby franchisee versus a distant franchisee; single unit 
franchisee versus multi-unit franchisee; and a novice franchisee recently integrated in the network versus an old 
franchisee fully familiar with the franchisor concept. These differences explain the wide variety of franchisees’ 
responses to the same type of control. Thus, monitoring levers should be used differently according to the needs of 
each franchisee. Taking these dimensions into account does not burden the governance system but rather highlights 
the franchisor’s adaptability towards its partners and enhances the quality of the franchisor-franchisee relationship. 
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Appendix A. Measures of variables 
Construct Code Description of measures 
Allocation of 
decision rights ADR 
To what extent do you participate in the following decision making? 
(1 = no extent to 5 = to a very large extent) 
(1) Product and/or service decision 
(2) Selecting suppliers 
(3) Resale price decision 
Nonfinancial 
performance 
measurement 
NFPM 
In order to assess your performance, to what extent does your franchisor rely on the 
following indicators? 
(1 = no extent to 5 = to a very large extent) 
(1) Customer satisfaction  
(2) Outlet holding 
(3) Delivery quality 
(4) Compliance with instructions 
Contract 
termination TERM 
To what extent do you feel threatened by the non-renewal or the termination of your 
contract in the following situations? 
(1 = no extent to 5 = to a very large extent) 
(1) Failure to comply with brand concept 
(2) Refusal of franchisor monitoring 
(3) False information16 
(4) Non-payment to the franchisor 
Geographic 
Distance DISTANCE 
How long does it take you to cover the distance between your outlet and the 
franchisor’s head office? 
(1) Less than 10 min 
(2) Between 10 and 30 min 
(3) Between 30 and 60 min 
(4)  Between 60 and 120 min 
(5)  More than 120 min 
Age of the 
relationship AGE 
How long have you been part of your current network? 
(1) Between 2 and 5 years 
(2) More than 5 to 10 years 
(3) More than 10 to 15 years 
(4) More than 15-20 
(5)  Over 20 years" 
Multi-unit 
ownership MULTIFSE Do you own more than one franchise outlet? (No = 0; Yes = 1) 
 
 
	 	
																																																						
16 Provision of false information to franchisor.	
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